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This paper aims to examine threats to auditor independence in Iran. A mixed 
questionnaire, including both quantitative closed-ended questions and an 
open-ended qualitative question, is developed to investigate threats to 
auditor independence. Moreover, thematic analysis is used to triangulate the 
results against financial media articles throughout 1994 – 2014. Findings 
suggest that while bribery, non-audit services, and economic condition are 
key threats to auditor independence in Iran, gifts and presents do not 
compromise independence given the Iranian culture. This study contributes 
to a better understanding of auditor independence in Iran, which may apply 
to other regional settings. Moreover, it provides some suggestions to 
improve the current Iranian Audit Organisation’s auditor independence 
framework. (JEL M32) 
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Introduction 
 
This paper aims to examine threats to auditor independence as identified in 
the research literature, and it triangulates these threats against the perceptions of 
professionals in Iran. Iran has experienced considerable business and accounting 
scandals over the past few decades that led to the gradual emergence of 
professional standards, including the audit profession (Rezaee & Davani, 2013). 
Various events, such as the country‟s engagement in a war with Iraq have 
prevented the country from conducting audit research (Salehi, Mansouri, & 
Pirayesh, 2008). 
Extant Iranian audit literature is insufficient to determine threats to auditor 
independence. Salehi, Mansouri, and Azary (2009a) investigate the expectation 
gap in independence between investors and auditors. Their study suggests a major 
difference in their perceptions regarding independence. Investors consider internal 
factors (such as prospects of re-appointment) as severe threats to independence, 
whereas auditors consider external factors (such as regularity framework and 
corporate governance) as serious threats (Salehi et al., 2009a). Salehi (2011) 
suggests that the existence of an audit committee may improve independence. 
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KarbasiYazdi and ChenariYukat (2012) suggest that a long-term relationship 
between auditors and their clients is a major threat to their independence 
(KarbasiYazdi & ChenariYukat, 2012). Abdoli, Mahmoudzadeh, and Darvishan 
(2014) show that a mandatory auditor rotation safeguards independence, whereas 
Eshagniya and Salehi (2017) suggest that even restatement of financial statements 
of a client company does not lure to a change of its auditor.  
This study has documented the Iran Statement of Membership No. 4 report of 
the International Federation of Accountants (IFAC) in 2009 and 2016. As per the 
report (www.ifac.org), the code of ethics development and implementation is still 
on an ongoing stage in Iran until 2017. The Iranian Institute of Certified Public 
Accountants has translated the IFAC code of ethics for professional accountants 
and is developing its ethical standards using Iranian laws, regulations, and other 
local factors. In 2014, The Iranian Audit Organisation (IAO) (also called The 
Audit Organisation), made changes to professional standards on independence to 
minimise the risk of auditor compromising independence and continues to exert its 
regulatory authority on compliance. Since then, there has been no investigation as 
to the effectiveness of this change. This study aims to provide insights on auditor 
independence in Iran by answering the following research questions: 
 
What are the potential threats to auditor independence, and how should a regulator 
prioritise them to enhance auditor independence in Iran? 
 
This study is motivated by four factors. Firstly, there is still a lack of 
empirical evidence in countries with specific settings like Iran. Iran is an Islamic 
jurisdiction predominated by Sharia‟s principles. It is also undergoing political 
tension(s) within and from outside the country. Beeman (2003) refers to the 
conflict between Iran and the U.S but much more as a cultural conflict of the post-
modern feature. There is also a shortage of qualified accountants, and the 
government is still struggling to upgrade professional accountancy education to an 
international standard level. Given this situation, this study argues that there is as 
such no proper standard on independence that would satisfy not only the needs of 
the Iranian but also the international stakeholders.  
Secondly, this study is also motivated by recent changes in professional 
standards related to auditor independence in Iran in a bid to increase our 
understanding of the similarities and differences compared to IFAC code of 
independence and other threats identified in the literature (Kosmala, 2007; Lee & 
Stone, 1995; Ramazani & Atani, 2010; Salehi & Husini, 2011). This study is also 
driven by the mixed, if not, conflicting results in the literature on threats to 
independence in Iran (MohammadRezaei, Mohd‐Saleh, Jaffar, & Hassan, 2016; 
Salehi, 2009a, 2009b; Salehi et al., 2009a). As advanced by Salehi (2009a), there 
is yet no clear evidence on auditor independence in Iran.  
Lastly, the research memo “Auditing Standards for clients Doing Business 
with Iran” of the Centre on Sanctions and Illicit Finance (CSIF) draws out 
attention on risks of auditors compromising independence in Iran. This CSIF 
discussion memorandum provides an assessment of the responsibilities of an 
external auditing firm whose clients are doing business with Iran. It covers 
auditing, disclosure, and reporting. This assessment explains the nature of 
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responsibilities for an external auditing firm and the responsibilities for 
strengthening the overall control environment in which trade with Iran is carried 
out. This assessment is designed to create awareness of the nature of auditor‟s 
professional duties concerning Iranian businesses. CSIF‟s goal is to initiate public 
discussion, encourage regulatory support, and most importantly, to encourage 
leading accounting firms to adopt relevant audit practices voluntarily (Dubowitz, 
2017). 
CSIF identifies Iran as a highly risky business environment. CSIF found that 
companies doing business with Iran were corrupted and had to incur massive fines. 
For example, a French oil company, Total S.A., paid $398 million in fines to U.S. 
authorities for paying for access to Iran‟s oil fields; a Norwegian firm paid a $3.5 
million fine to authorities for violating anti-bribery laws; and also been shown to 
have bribed Iranian officials for drilling rights. Iran ranks 130 out 168 for 
corruption by Transparency International, and 6/7 on country risk by the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. This study may 
contribute to the debate on auditor independence threats by providing insights on a 
country like Iran with its specificities in term of religion, culture, regulations, 
political tension, and efforts of the country to align if not harmonise with the 
international code of ethics on auditor independence. 
Using a survey-based approach through questionnaires, including both closed-
ended and open-ended question, this study empirically investigates perceptions of 
a sample of forty professionals on auditor independence in Iran. The findings 
suggest that bribery, non-audit services, and Iran‟s economic condition are primary 
threats to independence as opposed to gifts and presents. This finding suggests that 
gifts can be a business component without compromising auditor independence in 
Iran.  
This paper contributes to the literature in several ways. First, it provides a 
better understanding of the audit profession in Iran, a non-IFRS country with an 
Islamic legal system. Due to created opportunities by Islamic laws and non-IFRS 
background of Iran, this paper provides a lens of observation to auditor 
independence issue in Iran and beyond. Given the similarities in Iran with other 
regional nations, the obtained evidence in this study can be instructive to other 
countries in the Middle East and beyond (Mirshekary & Saudagaran, 2005). 
Second, given the current attention from the IAO to auditor independence issues, 
this paper provides an avenue for regulators and decision-makers to take 
preventive and corrective actions to safeguard auditor independence. Therefore, 
the capacity to prevent and detect fraud and error increases and financial 
statements may demonstrate a better picture regarding the financial affairs of 
companies. Precisely, as the IAO (2014a) recently identified 11 threats to auditor 
independence, this paper aligns with the IAO‟s Code through investigation and 
comparisons of different threats from the scholarly literature. Notably, not all 
threats in the literature align with the IAO‟s identified threats, so a variety of 
participants‟ perceptions in this paper suggests a lack of clarity regarding auditor 
independence issues in Iran. Third, this paper educates Iranian users of financial 
statements about audit profession, increasing their knowledge on how to protect 
themselves from financial loss. 
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The rest of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides the 
institutional background, outlining the legal and financial system of Iran. Section 3 
reviews the related literature on auditor independence, whereas section 4 lays out 
the research design and method. Section 5 reports and interprets the findings, and 
the paper ends in section 6 with a concluding note. 
 
Institutional Background 
 
Baskerville, Wynn-Williams, Evans, and Gillett (2014, p. 307) state that: 
“Ethnicity is critical to a greater or lesser degree depending on the socio-
historical backdrop and the array of political systems.” Ethnicity is a research 
continuum, beginning with nation-states as a unique culture and moving through 
to nations with multiple cultures (Baskerville et al., 2014). As such, each country‟s 
culture affects its legal system, which then affects its auditing practices (Ding, 
Jeanjean, & Stolowy, 2005). Sharia constitutes the Iranian constitution (Wright, 
2000) that is fundamental to its systems and practices.  
 
Religion and Auditing in Iran 
 
This study proceeds on the basis that Iran, as a nation-state, is a monoculture, 
where Islamic laws dominate its banking and finance system (Ismail & Tohirin, 
2010; Rostami, Pakdel, Hasanzadeh Kojou, & Hasanzadeh Kochou, 2016). 
Islamic revolutionists have supported the notion of a Sharia-based constitution 
throughout their Islamic movements before and after the Islamic Revolution in 
1979 (Arjomand, 2002). Article 4 of the Iranian constitution mentions that Islamic 
standards (including ethical standards) must govern all laws of the country, and 
any law which is not based on Islamic principles is null (AoE, 1979). The 
Guardian Council of the Constitution is responsible for ensuring the consistency of 
the proposed laws to the constitution and Islamic laws (CIA, 2014). 
Islamic principles shape audit practices (including auditor‟s code of ethics) of 
Islamic countries (Kasim, 2010). Sharia prohibits uncertainty, gambling, dealing 
with forbidden products (such as pornography or pork), monopoly, and 
misrepresentation (Black & Sadiq, 2011). In an Islamic setting, auditors have to 
serve the needs of their nation in general, contrary to non-Islamic settings, where 
auditors are mainly and directly responsible to their shareholders (Ibrahim, Man, 
& Noor, 2013a), though they have a duty of care for the public interest. Based on 
Sharia‟s principles an auditor should investigate any possible changes in the 
product‟s ingredients or its production formulas (Khan, 1985) an aspect which is 
not covered in financial statements audit under the Anglo-Saxon principle. 
Auditors should also examine the extent to which an auditee has practised Israf, 
referring to the existence of extravagance and overspending in the auditee (Khan, 
1985). Moreover, auditors should investigate the potential instances of Khiyanah, 
suggesting the existence of treachery, infidelity, or disloyalty and signs of any 
violation of trust regarding financial matters, honour, power, or position (Ibrahim 
et al., 2013a). Furthermore, they should determine whether the clients have 
practised Tatfif, i.e. treachery in weights and measures to other parties and their 
Athens Journal of Business & Economics XY 
 
5 
adherence to Sharia‟s injunction of Awful Mikyal Walmizan, referring to the 
accuracy of weights and measures of packed materials (Khan, 1985).  
 
Culture and Auditing in Iran 
 
There is a link between national culture and auditing (Khlif, 2016). Prevailing 
cultural values affect auditors‟ judgements (Patel, Harrison, & McKinnon, 2002). 
Power distance is one of the identified cultural dimensions by Lonner, Berry, and 
Hofstede (1980). Auditors in countries with a high level of power distance (e.g. 
Iran) are more likely to forgo their independence (Yamamura, Frakes, Sanders, & 
Ahn, 1996). When managers practise autocratic leadership, they do not respect the 
opinions of their subordinates (Javidan & Dastmalchian, 2003). They develop 
ideas and instruct their employees without considering their views (Javidan & 
Dastmalchian, 2003). They are highly performance-oriented, though they are not 
future-oriented (Ding et al., 2005).  
Individualism versus collectivism is another important factor (Lonner et al., 
1980). Auditors from individualistic cultures better retain their ethical standards 
regardless of the applied pressure, whereas auditors from collectivist cultures may 
quickly succumb to their clients‟ pressure (McKinnon, 1984). Moreover, auditors 
from countries with a high level of uncertainty avoidance are more careful in their 
decision-making, and they do not merely focus on audit plans and rules (Hughes, 
Sander, Higgs, & Cullinan, 2009). Iran is a country with a high level of power 
distance and a low degree of uncertainty avoidance and individualism (Bochner & 
Hesketh, 1994). As such, it is likely that Iranian professionals, such as auditors, 
may be more likely to sacrifice their independence because it is less likely that 
they will be questioned (Hillmann, 1990).  
 
Iran Audit Organisation (IAO) 
 
Iran Audit Organisation (IAO) is the primary regulator of the audit 
profession in Iran (Mirshekary & Saudagaran, 2005). It was established by an act 
of the Iranian Parliament in 1987. It is affiliated to the Ministry of Economic 
Affairs and Finance. Its main objectives are to address the needs of government 
regarding audit and specialised financial services, to set accounting and audit 
standards in accordance with Sharia, and to fulfil the country‟s needs regarding 
accountancy. While considering the Iranian taxation rules and customs, it has 
modified the Iranian accounting standards based on international standards since 
1997. The Accounting Standards Setting Committee of IAO produces the Iranian 
accounting standards. The committee has nine members. Five of them are from 
Board of Executive of IAO, two from Iranian Association of Certified Public 
Accountants, one from Security Exchange Agent Organisation, and one 
representative from industry (Chatterjee, Mirshekary, Al Farooque, & Safari, 
2010). 
IAO introduced 33 audit guidelines in 1997, which after revision became 
standards in 1999. It revised some of them in later years (Gholamhossin & 
Abdolhamid, 2012). The IAO codified and published a revised set of audit 
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standards using the International Accounting Standards (IAS). It released a 
comparative table that compares the National Accounting Standards with IAS, and 
it introduced the national standards that are very similar to IAS (Mirshekary & 
Saudagaran, 2005). Failure to comply with the principles and criteria for 
professional competence and care, non-compliance with the provisions of Code of 
Professional Conduct, and any behaviour against the professional affairs may lead 
IAO to consider some disciplinary actions (IAO, 2014a). The disciplinary actions 
can range from compulsory learnings; oral and written warnings; fines, restitution, 
and completing job through other members at the expense of offender; prevention 
from the independent professional activities; suspension of membership; to 
expulsion from the professional bodies for any non-compliance (IAO, 2014a). 
 
Iranian Capital Market Development and Auditing 
 
Iran recognised the importance of the capital market during the 1930s 
(Mashayekhi & Mashayekh, 2008). The Stock Exchange Act of the Parliament led 
to the formation of the Tehran Stock Exchange (TSE) in 1966. TSE officially 
started its operation on 4 February 1967. After the 1979 Islamic revolution, there 
were no national accounting standards in place, and many listed companies on 
TSE obtained a qualified audit report (Tabibi, 1993). In a bid to address this 
lacking, Iranian government established different audit enterprises such as Budget, 
Planning, and National Industries Organisation to manage its governmental 
entities (Moghaddam, Shadmehr, Mousavian, & Minab, 2012). Moreover, the Act 
of using expert and professional services of certified accountants as official 
accountants of the Parliament led to the formation of the Society of Certified 
Accountants of Iran in 1993 (Moghaddam et al., 2012). 
 
Figure 1. Structure of the Iranian Capital Market. 
 
Source: http://tse.ir/cms/Page57.html. 
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TSE joined the Federation of Euro-Asian Stock Exchanges in 1995 (TSE, 
2006). Moreover, it permitted listed companies to issue corporate bonds in 2003 
(TSE, 2006). The new Securities Act enabled the Securities and Exchange 
Organisation and Securities and Exchange High Council to govern the Iranian 
capital market in 2005 (TSE, 2005). Iranian government established the National 
Development Fund based on Article 84 of its Fifth Five-year Socio-Economic 
Development Plan (2011-2015) in 2011 to use its oil revenues for its future 
investments (Fashtami, 2014). Figure 1 depicts the Iranian capital market. 
 
International and Iranian Ethical Standards for Professional Accountants 
 
According to the International Ethics Standards Board for Accountants threats 
to auditor independence are grouped into five categories (IFAC, 2013), contrary to 
IAO where they are listed in eleven different situations (IAO, 2014b). Table 1 
shows the equivalence of the IAO‟s list of independence threats with the 
categories of threats to independence as per the International Ethics Standards 
Board for Accountants. 
 
Table 1. Equivalence Table: IAO and IFAC – Threats to Auditor Independence 
IAO IFAC 
Family, personal, or financial relationship between auditors 
and their clients 
a & d 
Inclusion of auditors in their clients‟ board of directors, senior 
officers, or partners 
b & c 
Provision of non-audit services to clients a 
High management pressure on auditors e 
High audit fees a 
Existence of contingent fees a & e 
Purchasing and accepting gifts and hospitality a & d 
Ownership of audit firms by those other than auditors e 
Presence of former audit partners as clients b & d 
Existence of lawsuits between auditors and their clients c & e 
Long-term association between auditors and their clients a, b, & d 
Note: a = self-interest threat, b = self-review threat, c = advocacy threat, d = familiarity threat, 
and e = intimidation threat. 
 
A review of past studies on audit independence in the Iranian literature 
reveals gifts and presents, bribery, audit partner tenure, prospects of 
reappointment, non-existence of an audit committee, and auditors‟ lack of 
competence as threats to independence (Abdoli et al., 2014; Dehghan, 2013; 
Salehi, 2009a, 2011; Salehi & Husini, 2011; Salehi et al., 2009a). Table 2 provides 
a comparison between identified threats in IFRS countries, Iran, and the 
international threat framework. The reason(s) for including IFRS countries is that 
they are more likely to adopt IFAC ethical standards.  
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Table 2. Threats to Auditor Independence: IFRS Countries, Iran, and 
International Threat Framework 
IFRS 
countries 
Reference 
Equivalence 
to the 
international 
threat 
framework 
Iran Reference 
Equivalence to 
the international 
threat 
framework 
Receiving 
gifts and 
presents 
Du (2018), 
Fern (1985) 
a & d 
 
Receiving 
gifts and 
presents 
Salehi 
(2009a), 
Salehi et al. 
(2009a) 
a & d 
Bribery 
Kosmala 
(2007) 
a Bribery 
Dehghan 
(2013), 
Ramazani 
and Atani 
(2010) 
A 
Audit 
partner 
tenure 
Ye, Carson, 
and Simnett 
(2006) 
a, b, & d 
Audit partner 
tenure 
 
 
 
 
Prospects of 
reappointment 
 
Abdoli et 
al. (2014), 
Salehi and 
Kangarlouei 
(2010) 
 
Salehi et al. 
(2009a) 
 
 
a, b, & d 
 
 
 
 
a & b 
 
Non-
existence 
of an audit 
committee 
Gul (1989), 
Nur 
Barizah 
Abu, Abdul 
Rahim 
Abdul, and 
Hafiz Majdi 
Abdul 
(2005), 
Teoh and 
Lim (1996) 
a, c, & d 
Non-existence 
of an audit 
committee 
Salehi 
(2009a, 
2011) 
a, c, & d 
Auditors‟ 
lack of 
competence 
Lee and 
Stone 
(1995) 
a & e 
Auditors‟ lack 
of 
competence 
Mansouri, 
Pirayesh, 
and Salehi 
(2009), 
Salehi and 
Husini 
(2011) 
a & e 
Note: a = self-interest threat, b = self-review threat, c = advocacy threat, d = familiarity threat, 
and e = intimidation threat. 
 
There are differences between IFRS countries and Iran regarding auditors‟ 
legal liabilities (Rostami et al., 2016). In an IFRS country, auditors may lose their 
licence if they fail to maintain their independence (Beattie, Brandt, & Fearnley, 
1999). However, audit firms that breach the regulations of Iranian Association of 
Certified Public Accountants may face one of the two potential consequences. 
First, they may incur a penalty from the quality control committee of the 
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Association (which would not be severe) (Azizkhani, Shailer, & Monroe, 2012). 
Second, they may lose their licence after an assessment of the peer review audit 
committee of Securities and Exchange Organisation (which would be rare) 
(Azizkhani et al., 2012). Given that Iranian law does not consider any civil action 
against audit firms to recover damages, the risk of litigation is low. As a result, 
auditors may have more rooms to compromise their independence (Azizkhani et 
al., 2012).  
 
 
Literature Review 
 
Auditor Independence: A Global Overview 
 
Auditor independence is the cornerstone of the audit profession (Du, 2018; 
Franzel, 2012). Prior research suggests that accounting scandals trigger reforms 
and new regulations for the profession (Bhasin, 2013; Hilary & Lennox, 2005; 
Kozloski, Meckfessel, Moehrle, & Williams, 2016; Pai & Tolleson, 2015). In 
consequence, some have developed their ethical standards, whereas others have 
fully adopted the IFAC code of ethics (Branson, Chen, & Anderson, 2015). As for 
now, more than 130 countries have adopted IFAC ethical standards (IFAC, 2018). 
However, the question of whether it is possible to regulate or mandate auditor 
independence attracts much attention in mature capital markets such as the United 
States, the United Kingdom, and Australia (Stevenson, 2002; Umar & 
Anandarajan, 2004).  
Regulatory approaches inevitably seek to mandate auditor independence 
(DeFond, Raghunandan, & Subramanyam, 2002; Watts & Zimmerman, 1983). 
For example, they make proposals to prohibit particular conflict of interest 
situations (Moore, Tetlock, Tanlu, & Bazerman, 2006), including provisions of 
non-audit services (Craswell, 1999), or impose requirements regarding audit 
partner rotation (Carey & Simnett, 2006b).  
 
Non-audit Services 
 
International Code of Ethics for Professional Accountants mentions that the 
provision of non-audit services may result in self-review, self-interest, and 
advocacy threats (IFAC, 2014a). The Code instructs auditors to evaluate potential 
threats of non-audit services before any engagement. The auditors should preclude 
to provide any non-audit services if they are unable to reduce independence threats 
to an acceptable level (IFAC, 2014a). Non-audit services can compromise auditor 
independence for two reasons: First, they increase auditors‟ financial dependency 
on their clients, reducing their desire to disagree with their clients‟ requirements. A 
high amount of non-audit services creates significant revenues for auditors, 
making it more harmful to lose their clients. High non-audit fees outweigh 
potential costs of non-audit services (litigation risk and reputation loss), making it 
worthy to compromise auditor independence (DeFond et al., 2002). Second, 
managerial role resulted from consultancy nature of non-audit services brings bias 
Vol. X, No. Y Mirzay Fashami et al.: Threats to Auditor Independence: Evidence… 
 
10 
into auditors‟ judgement, endangering their independence (SEC, 2000). 
Consultancy services provide private information for auditors, generating them 
economic rent by decreasing audit costs (Campa & Donnelly, 2016).  
Non-audit services are highly associated with independence in appearance. 
They signal a lack of independence, reducing users‟ trust in financial statements 
(Beck, Frecka, & Solomon, 1988b). They increase the likelihood of a self-
selection bias (Abdel-Khalik, 1990). Independent auditors are more likely to lose 
their job as a consequence of their disputes with their clients (Simunic, 1984). 
High non-audit services impair independence, reducing auditors‟ desire to dispute 
with their clients. This increases auditors‟ tenure with their clients (Beck, Frecka, 
& Solomon, 1988a). It reduces the likelihood of a qualified audit opinion‟s 
issuance. It encourages auditors to maintain their relationship with their clients to 
continue receiving their income, regardless of potential harms to their 
independence (Hay, Knechel, & Li, 2006a). However, Iranian literature does not 
consider non-audit services as threats to auditor independence. This suggests 
differences between Iranian and international audit environments, motivating this 
study to identify independence threats in Iran. 
 
Audit Firm & Audit Partner Tenure 
 
Audit firm tenure refers to the length of time an audit firm works for a client, 
whereas audit partner tenure refers to the length of time a partner of the audit firm 
conducts the audits of its client (Chen, Lin, & Lin, 2008). Many countries such as 
Argentina, Australia, Belgium, China, Denmark, France, Germany, Hong Kong, 
Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Russia, Taiwan, the UK, and the 
U.S. limit their audit partner tenure (Lennox, Wu, & Zhang, 2014). For example, 
the U.S. and the UK require audit partner rotation and a cooling-off period of 
every five years (APB, 2009; SEC, 2002, 2003). Moreover, China requires audit 
partner rotation of every five years with a two-year cooling-off period (Lennox et 
al., 2014), whereas Taiwan requires rotation of every five years with no cooling-
off period (Chi, Huang, Liao, & Xie, 2009). However, they do not require 
mandatory rotation of audit firms (Lennox et al., 2014).  
Nevertheless, six countries (Brazil, India, Italy, Singapore, South Korea, and 
Turkey) have a legal requirement to rotate their audit firms after a maximum 
specified period (Bleibtreu & Stefani, 2013; Liang, 2015). For example, South 
Korea has mandated audit firm rotation every seven years since 2006 (Kwon, Lim, 
& Simnett, 2010). Moreover, the European Union has recently mandated rotation 
of audit firms (European Parliament, 2014). The Australian Securities and 
Investment Commission's Chairman mentions that they have noticed a 30% rise in 
audit failures of listed companies in 2012 (Durkin & King, 2012). The Chairman 
warns that a mandatory audit firm rotation would be proposed to the Australian 
government if they detect any further rise in audit failures (Jenkins & Vermeer, 
2013). 
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Audit Partner Tenure: Pros & Cons 
 
International Code of Ethics for Professional Accountants mentions that a 
long-term relationship between auditors and their clients may lead to familiarity 
and self-interest threats (IFAC, 2014a). The Code mentions that an auditor should 
not remain a key partner of a company for more than seven years. The auditor 
should not participate in audit-related activities, provide consultation services, or 
influence outcomes of engagement for a minimum period of two years after 
completion of its seven years engagement period (IFAC, 2014a). Similarly, term 
21.17 of the Iran Audit Organisation‟s Code of Professional Conduct mentions 
that a long-term relationship between auditors and their clients may threaten 
auditor independence. In such circumstances, auditors shall take the necessary 
measures to safeguard their independence (IAO, 2014a). Paragraph 2 of clause 10 
of Tehran Stock Exchange requirements obliges all public listed companies to 
rotate their audit partners every four years (Abdoli et al., 2014). This requirement 
does not permit the listed companies to reassign their former audit partners in 
future (Abdoli et al., 2014). 
A long-term relationship encourages auditors to readily accept their auditee‟s 
accounting and reporting choices (Chen et al., 2008). A long-term tenure creates a 
personal relationship between auditors and their clients (Chen et al., 2008). It 
compromises auditors‟ objectivity because direct and indirect management‟s 
pressures affect their attitude over time (Carey & Simnett, 2006a). Auditors‟ bias 
influences their behaviour during the audit and reporting process, wherein in case 
of a conflict of interest auditors favour their clients (Dopuch, King, & Schwartz, 
2003). A long-term tenure increases familiarity threat, limiting the number of 
effective audit-testing methods. It routines an audit plan, reducing auditors‟ desire 
to use creativity in their audit procedures (Arrunada & Paz-Ares, 1997). Moreover, 
it reduces auditors‟ desire to issue a qualified audit opinion, reducing the quality of 
their services (DeFond et al., 2002). 
However, a long-term relationship between auditors and their clients can also 
be beneficial, as it increases auditors‟ knowledge regarding their clients‟ 
operations and systems (Petty & Cuganesan, 1996). Auditors should conduct 
various substandard audits on their new clients to gain enough knowledge 
regarding their operation (Berton, 1991). They may not detect irregularities during 
their initial engagement years because of their lack of familiarity, reducing audit 
quality (Petty & Cuganesan, 1996). Auditors do not have sufficient knowledge to 
establish relevant quality controls to detect irregularities in initial stages. They 
need to have enough time to familiarise themselves with their clients‟ audit 
methodology and databases (Carey & Simnett, 2006a). Moreover, they face a 
higher litigation risk in the initial stages of their audit because of their lack of 
knowledge about their clients‟ specific risks (Palmrose, 1989). 
Client-specific knowledge is essential for auditors‟ work, though other types 
of knowledge such as general and industry knowledge help auditors to complete 
their tasks (Knapp, 1991). Auditors may not detect material misstatements during 
the initial years of their engagements, due to their lack of client-specific 
knowledge (Beck et al., 1988b). Lack of client-specific knowledge may cause 
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auditors to readily accept their clients‟ explanations (Kinney Jr & McDaniel, 
1996). Auditors‟ extra efforts cannot mitigate their lack of knowledge about their 
client-specific threats. Therefore, the likelihood of fraudulent financial reporting is 
higher during the initial years of engagement (Carcello & Nagy, 2004). However, 
long-term tenure leads to less extreme income-increasing and income-decreasing 
accruals, restricting earnings management (Myers, Myers, & Omer, 2003). 
 
The Scope of Audit Report According to Sharia 
 
Islam has banned any risky or hazardous sale because it may lead to an 
argument among the related parties (Khan, 2011). Based on Sharia, auditors 
should report particular transactions. For example, they should determine whether 
a client has engaged in the sale of al-gharar, meaning the sale of a product which is 
not present, or its consequence is unknown (Ibrahim, Man, & Noor, 2013b). 
Moreover, they should discover the extent to which a client has practised Israf, 
meaning the existence of extravagance in an auditee. The governments determine 
the adequate level of expenditures, helping auditors to discover Israf (Khan, 1985). 
Furthermore, auditors should report to what extent their clients have practised 
Bakhs, meaning voluntary attempts to reduce the value of a product before its sale. 
Thus, auditors should investigate any possible change in a product‟s ingredients or 
its production formulas (Khan, 1985). Further, they should investigate potential 
instances of Khiyanah, meaning the existence of treachery, infidelity, or disloyalty. 
They should look for signals of any violation of trust regarding financial matters, 
honour, power, or position (Ibrahim et al., 2013b).  
Based on Sharia, auditors should determine any Tatfif practised by their 
clients, meaning harms in weights and measures caused to other parties. They 
should measure their client‟s adherence to Sharia‟s injunction of Awful Mikyal 
Walmizan, meaning the accuracy of weights and measures of packed materials 
(Khan, 1985). Moreover, auditors should investigate their auditee‟s compliance 
with Uqud, meaning the fulfilment of its contracts. They should search for the 
areas where an auditee has failed to meet its contractual obligations and report 
them (Khan, 1985). Furthermore, they should determine if there is any indication 
of dishonesty, fraud, or deceit in an auditee. They should consider a broad range, 
from embezzlement and misappropriation to trade secrets or intellectual property 
to conflict of interest or commitment (Ibrahim et al., 2013b). Khan (2011) states 
that falsehood damages producers, traders, and customers. Auditors should 
determine the existence of any falsehood or breach of pact or promise in their 
client‟s organisation and report them (Ibrahim et al., 2013b).  
 
Audit-related studies in Iran 
 
Existing audit-related literature is insufficient to understand the audit market 
and auditor independence in Iran. Expectation gap between auditors and investors 
is investigated by Salehi, Mansoury, and Azary (2009b). The results suggest that 
there is a major difference between auditors and investors‟ perception regarding 
the actual level of auditor independence. Investors consider internal factors (i.e. 
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prospects of reappointment) as serious threats, whereas auditors consider external 
factors (i.e. regularity framework and corporate governance) as serious threats to 
independence. There is a significant difference between auditors and investors‟ 
perceptions of gifts and presents. Perceptions regarding prospects of reappointment 
are considerably different too (Salehi et al., 2009b). Salehi et al. (2009b) suggest at 
least some common grounds in perceptions between auditors and investors 
regarding the expected level of auditor independence, albeit at different levels. 
Both groups consider gifts and presents and prospects of reappointment as threats 
to auditor independence (Salehi et al., 2009b). 
The effects of a long-term relationship between auditors and their clients on 
auditor independence are investigated by KarbasiYazdi and ChenariYukat (2012). 
Their study finds this relationship a major threat to independence. The long-term 
relationship encourages auditors to incorporate their clients‟ requests, preventing 
them from working objectively. In contrast, a mandatory rotation increases 
auditors‟ resistance against management pressure (KarbasiYazdi & ChenariYukat, 
2012). The effects of two influential factors (audit firm size and auditor‟s report) in 
audit partner rotation‟s decisions are investigated by Abdoli et al. (2014) in 
another Iranian study. Their study shows that concerned factors do not affect 
rotation decisions. Their study emphasises on the importance of rotation to 
maintain auditor independence.  
Prior research regarding audit committees of Iranian companies emphasises 
on their role. For example, Salehi and Abedini (2008) find that the existence of an 
audit committee improves auditor independence. Salehi and Azary (2008) suggest 
that audit committees ensure the objectivity of financial reporting. Salehi and 
Nanjegowda (2006) find that audit committees contribute to decision makings 
regarding auditors‟ selection, retention, and dismissal. Although the importance of 
audit committees is acknowledged by prior studies, they do not play an important 
role in Iranian companies (Salehi, 2011). The barriers to an effective audit 
committee are investigated by Salehi (2011). Salehi finds that individualism 
among Iranian audit practitioners, centralisation trend of Iranian managers, and 
lack of an effective legal force are major causes of audit committees‟ 
ineffectiveness (Salehi, 2011). 
 
Auditor Independence in Iran 
 
Gifts and presents 
 
Social networking is an essential part of modern businesses (Taormina & Kin-
Mei Lao, 2007). Business people may be unable to pursue their objectives alone 
and use gifts to achieve them (Law, 2010). Gifts and presents are acceptable in 
some business cultures, such as Chinese (Hwang & Staley, 2005). They are a sign 
of respect in China (Levy, 1995). Similarly, Iran has deeply embedded traditions 
regarding gifts. The former king of Iran, Fath Ali Shah, sent his portraits abroad as 
gifts to show Persian royal power (Anonymous, 2011). Another king, Shah 
Muhammad Khudabanda, sent 34 camels piled high with treasure to the former 
Turkish king, Ottoman Sultan Selim II, as a sign of respect in 1567. Large animals 
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such as horses and elephants were used to express respect, the award rendered 
services, or celebrate annual events like the New Year throughout the 16
th
 and 17
th
 
century (Ybarra, 2011). Formal gifts are widely accepted in Iran. Some occasions 
require particular gifts. These gifts merely symbolise existing relationships 
(Betteridge, 1985). 
However, according to term 21.13 of Iran Audit Organisation‟s Code of 
Professional Conduct purchase of goods or services with specific conditions, 
acceptance of irrelevant gifts, and receiving more than a reasonable amount of 
gifts are serious threats to auditor independence. Term 15.2.E states that auditors 
must refrain from accepting or giving gifts that may reasonably lead to a belief that 
their professional judgement or those who deal with them is affected. Unusual 
gifts can vary based on the circumstances. However, overall, auditors shall abstain 
from being placed in situations that damage their professional reputation (IAO, 
2014a). 
Gifts may result in illegal payments, corruption, and bribery (Snell, 1999). 
They increase the likelihood of violating laws, auditing standards, and codes of 
professional conduct (Hwang & Staley, 2005). They lead to hidden trades, power 
dependence, and bureaucratic privileges (Fan, 2002). Gifts damage fiduciary 
duties of auditors, benefiting them at others‟ costs (Dunfee & Warren, 2001). Prior 
research suggests that offering presents affect perceived independence, wherein 
even small gifts are threats to independence (Du, 2018; Fern, 1985; Pany & 
Reckers, 1980). Moreover, gifts lead to a bias in auditors‟ decisions and prevent 
them from precisely checking areas of concern (Fern, 1985). They negatively 
affect auditors‟ judgments in a conflict of interest situation, leading to unethical 
behaviours (Au & Wong, 2000). Ethical auditors actively avoid any unethical 
behaviour, including the acceptance of gifts (Fern, 1985). They exercise their 
duties while preventing any potential threat to their independence (Au & Wong, 
2000).  
 
Bribery 
 
Bribery is to encourage someone to do something illegal or influence its sense 
of justice, due process, and discretion in favour of the giver through provision or 
promise of something instead (Arowosaiye, 2008). It is a significant threat for 
today‟s business, remaining a primary concern for various organisations. It may 
happen in any department at any level. It affects the overall effectiveness of a 
market on top of its processes and individuals. Bribers prioritise their interests over 
others, damaging trust between business partners and destabilising lawfulness of 
social institutions (Turow, 1985). The public in any country do not accept bribery 
and request their authorities to combat against fraud.  
Article 49 of the Iranian Constitution (Confiscation) mentions that the 
government is responsible for confiscating all wealth accumulated through bribery 
and restoring it to its legitimate owner. If no owner can be identified, the wealth 
must be entrusted to the public treasury (Assembly of Experts, 1979). This rule 
must be executed by the government with due care, after investigation and 
provision of necessary evidence under Islamic laws (Assembly of Experts, 1979). 
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Moreover, term 6 of the Iranian Institute of Certified Accountants‟ Code of 
Professional Conduct mentions that as moral characteristics of auditors are the 
most important part of their profession, the audit principles should satisfy them 
(IICA, 1985). 
Bribery affects auditors‟ role for several reasons. First, it encourages auditors 
to increase their efforts or fees to prevent potential future litigations or reputation 
losses (Simunic, 1984). Second, it lessens the credibility of faulty companies, 
reducing their share values (Smith, Stettler, & Beedles, 1984). It leads to price and 
volume variability (Lyon & Maher, 2005). Third, management‟s turnover as a 
consequence of loss of reputation, costs of avoiding any potential investment in 
highly corrupted settings, costs to build an adequate internal control infrastructure 
to deter bribery, and costs of hiring external bodies to investigate fraud are 
additional costs associated with bribery (Lyon & Maher, 2005). 
 
Audit partner tenure 
 
A long-term tenure creates a certain level of confidence regarding auditees‟ 
financial statements, reducing auditors‟ desire to check financial reports effectively 
(Shockley, 1981). The likelihood that auditors issue a going-concern opinion for a 
client that is close to insolvency increases, as their relationship period increases 
(Geiger & Raghunandan, 2002). Similarly, Copley and Doucet (1993) suggest a 
negative association between audit partner tenure and audit quality. A long-term 
relationship increases auditors‟ reliance on internal audit reports, discouraging 
them from using rigorous audit procedures (Arrunada & Paz-Ares, 1997). 
Auditors may tend to predict the outcomes before the conduct of an audit, 
reducing the likelihood of discovering mistakes and errors (Arrunada & Paz-Ares, 
1997). Limitation of auditors‟ future income because of a mandatory rotation helps 
them to maintain their audit quality throughout their auditors‟ engagement period 
(Johnson, Khurana, & Reynolds, 2002). 
A prolonged tenure discourages audit firms to compete against each other 
(Carrera, Gómez-Aguilar, Humphrey, & Ruiz-Barbadillo, 2007). Moreover, it 
limits the scope of auditors, preventing them from becoming familiar with other 
industries. Auditors do not attempt to update their knowledge and skill to respond 
to current requirements of their audit market, reducing the likelihood of the audit 
market improvement (Carrera et al., 2007). Therefore, audit quality declines and 
potential investors lose their confidence in the market (Craswell, Stokes, & 
Laughton, 2002). Ye et al. (2006) find that audit partner tenure is the most critical 
threat to auditor independence. Similarly, Copley and Doucet (1993) show a 
negative relationship between audit partner tenure and audit quality in government 
audits. 
 
Prospects of reappointment 
 
The term 8.7 of Iranian Institute of Certified Accountants‟ Code of 
Professional Conduct states that an auditor shall not accept another auditor‟s work 
unless the other auditor‟s right to practice is officially revoked or professional 
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reasons regarding non-acceptance of a job by the other auditor are not mentioned. 
The auditor shall request the name of the former auditor from their client company 
in writing upon receipt of a new job offer and in case the former auditor is 
confirmed or with permission of client company contact the former auditor via 
registered post and investigate any likely professional reasons. In case of the 
existence of professional reasons or refusal of the client company to permit to 
contact, the auditor is banned from accepting the job offer (IICA, 1985). 
A desire for reappointment influences audit firms‟ behaviours, wherein they 
may sacrifice their loss of reputation and litigation risks to continue receiving their 
audit fees (Raghunathan, Lewis, & Evans III, 1994). Expected future fees increase 
auditors‟ dependency on their clients (Gietzmann & Sen, 2002). They may have a 
greater tendency to collude with their auditees to maintain their position 
(Gietzmann & Sen, 2002). They may surrender to their clients‟ desire to obtain 
non-audit services in their next engagement (Raghunathan et al., 1994). Moreover, 
a desire for reappointment may encourage auditors to engage in low-balling to 
offset their initial loss by gaining in subsequent periods (Simon & Francis, 1988).  
Some companies voluntarily permit their shareholders to vote regarding their 
auditors‟ reappointment (Krishnan & Ye, 2005). Shareholders are often more 
dissatisfied with their auditors than what their votes suggest (Sainty, Taylor, & 
Williams, 2002). Auditors‟ desire to succumb to their clients‟ aggressive 
accounting techniques decreases as outside investors exercise control over their 
selection (Moore et al., 2006). Some factors may affect shareholders‟ votes 
regarding their auditors‟ reappointment. For example, auditors that have a long-
term tenure (Dao, Mishra, & Raghunandan, 2008), provide non-audit services 
(Raghunandan, 2003), and issue a going-concern opinion (Sainty et al., 2002) are 
more likely to receive a negative vote from their shareholders. 
 
Non-existence of an audit committee 
 
TSE‟s requirements state that the purpose of audit committees‟ formation is to 
help boards of directors regarding their supervisory responsibility to obtain 
reasonable confidence regarding effectiveness of governance processes, risk 
management, and internal controls; financial reporting health; internal audits 
effectiveness; independent auditors independence and independent audits 
effectiveness; and observance of rules, provisions, and requirements (TSE, 2013).  
Prior research suggests that an audit committee plays an essential role in 
safeguarding auditor independence (Gold, Klynsmit, Wallage, & Wright, 2014; 
He, Pittman, Rui, & Wu, 2017; Nur Barizah Abu et al., 2005; Soliman & Ragab, 
2014). For example, Nur Barizah Abu et al. (2005) examine factors that may 
influence auditor independence from commercial loan officers‟ perspectives in 
Malaysian-owned commercial banks. They find that the non-existence of an audit 
committee poses a threat to objectivity (Nur Barizah Abu et al., 2005). An audit 
committee‟s principal duty is to monitor the financial reporting processes of its 
company (Nelson, Elliott, & Tarpley, 2000). Committee members frequently meet 
with external auditors and financial managers to monitor financial statements, 
audit processes, and internal accounting controls of the company (Nelson et al., 
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2000). Their expertise reduces the likelihood of financial restatements because 
they better understand the internal audit system and governance structure of their 
company (Raghunandan, Rama, & Read, 2001). 
An audit committee works as an arbiter between a company‟s management 
and its audit firm to create a fair and precise report (Klein, 2002). It may intervene 
on different matters, such as management judgements, accounting estimates and 
audit adjustments, disagreements between management and auditors, and 
transactions between the company and its officers or employees (Klein, 2002). It 
frequently meets with financial managers and auditors to monitor its company‟s 
audit process (Carcello & Neal, 2003). It may prevent an auditor‟s dismissal in 
case of a disagreement with management (Carcello & Neal, 2003). An 
independent audit committee encourages auditors to prioritise the interests of 
shareholders and express the realities (Levine & Kornish, 2000). Independent 
members reduce the necessity of a legal intervention to protect shareholders 
(Levine & Kornish, 2000). However, prior social and professional ties such as 
prior employment between audit committee members and management increase 
management‟s ability to influence the committee‟s decisions (Westphal & Stern, 
2006).  
 
Auditors’ lack of competence 
 
The term 11.C of Iran Audit Organisation‟s Code of Professional Conduct 
states that auditors shall perform their duties with accuracy, competence, and 
perseverance. They shall consistently maintain their professional knowledge and 
skill at a level, wherein confidence can be obtained that their services are 
acceptable and offered according to the latest developments in profession, rules, 
and regulations (IAO, 2014a). The term 22 states that auditors shall refrain from 
accepting the professional services that they do not have the competence to 
perform. The term allows auditors to use expert services while accepting a job if 
they need them to perform some of their professional services (IAO, 2014a). 
Competence and independence are two mutually inclusive characteristics of 
an audit, wherein independence is unachievable unless auditors have the required 
competence (Barnes & Huan, 1993). Lee and Stone (1995) investigate the relation 
between auditor competence and independence. Their findings suggest that 
assuming no other conflicting interests, a greater probability of competence leads 
to a higher chance of independence (Lee & Stone, 1995). Alternatively, assuming 
no other conflicting interests, a greater probability of incompetence results in a 
higher likelihood of dependence (Lee & Stone, 1995). Lee and Stone find 
competence as a prerequisite for independence. That is, independence is possible if 
an auditor is competent and able to satisfactorily complete the designated audit 
tasks (Lee & Stone, 1995). 
Auditors should have enough training and knowledge regarding legal and 
contractual terms and also the ability to apply professional reasoning. Auditors‟ 
proficiency reduces audit risk, as sufficient knowledge about a client company and 
its environment helps auditors in their client‟s acceptance decisions (Hayes & 
Schilder, 2005). Technical knowledge of auditors enables them to detect a 
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company‟s aggressive accounting practices, providing an opportunity to provide 
their reports reasonably (Beattie, Fearnley, & Brandt, 2004). Auditors‟ 
competency enables them to identify misleading prospectuses, protecting the 
potential investors‟ funds. Moreover, it helps auditors to evaluate the management 
control systems and their cost policies (Hayes & Schilder, 2005).  
Competent auditors can detect and prevent fraud (Hayes & Schilder, 2005). 
Moreover, they can assess a company‟s success to achieve its goals (Johnsen, 
Robertsen, & Äsland, 2004). They can respond to complex situations, enabling 
them to produce a credible audit report without any reliance on internal reports 
(Mironiuc, Chersan, & Robu, 2013). Auditors often rely on prior year‟s risk 
assessments to plan a new assessment, wherein difficult tasks encourage more 
reliance on prior works (Monroe & Ng, 2000). Auditors‟ incompetence increases 
the likelihood of a failure, because prior years‟ results may not apply to the current 
year. Incompetent auditors do not critically evaluate outcomes of risk assessments 
because of their lack of understanding regarding them (Bagranoff & Vendrzyk, 
2000). 
 
 
Research Design  
 
This study uses a questionnaire survey-based to conduct this research similar 
to past studies on related topics (Singh, 2008). Prior Iranian audit-related studies 
use questionnaires to collect data from their participants (Abdoli et al., 2014; 
Saeidi, 2012; Salehi, 2011; Salehi & Husini, 2011; Salehi et al., 2009a). In order to 
assist in quantifying the responses from the survey, this study has used a five-level 
Likert scale to examine the six identified threats (as discussed in Section 3) to 
auditor independence. Because close-ended questions cannot capture all responses, 
this study has further used an open-ended question to allow participants to 
nominate other threats (Abdoli et al., 2014; Saeidi, 2012; Salehi, 2011; Salehi & 
Husini, 2011).  
 
Questionnaire  
 
Structure and Contents 
 
The questionnaire is divided into three sections. Section I: Demographic 
information, Section II: Experience and perception regarding threats to auditor 
independence, and Section III: Additional comments on threats to auditor 
independence in Iran. The first section contains five questions and asks 
participants to discuss their demographic information. The second part contains 
five questions and requires participants to rank the importance of the six identified 
threats from the previous literature based on their experience and opinion about 
them. The last section, in an open-ended question, asks participants to nominate 
other threats to auditor independence in Iran based on their personal views. A copy 
of the questionnaire is given in Appendix 1. 
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Administration 
 
A pilot study was conducted on two accounting academics and an academic 
ethical adviser to assess the understandability and simplicity of the questions in the 
questionnaire. The questionnaire was then revised according to their suggestions. 
As participants had to answer some questions regarding their professional life 
experience, they may have felt more comfortable with a self-administered 
questionnaire than other methods that require direct contact with a researcher. The 
self-administered questionnaire ensured their privacy and provided them with 
sufficient time to analyse the questions and provide their desired responses (Gregg, 
2008). It prevented the researcher‟s influence over participants, reducing bias in 
this study (Babbie, 2007). 
The questionnaire was administered in English as this study targeted 
professionals. The authors appointed an agent to distribute the questionnaires in 
Tehran because the distance was a problem. There are acknowledged difficulties 
in administering a questionnaire in a jurisdiction outside of a researcher‟s location. 
The agent made a phone call to the identified audit firms with a brief overview of 
the research and asked them whether they are willing to participate. If audit firms 
showed their willingness to participate, the agent distributed the questionnaires 
among participants at their preferred time. However, if participants needed to have 
some time to respond to this query, the agent asked for an appropriate time to call 
them back. If participants were unwilling to participate the agent apologised them 
for the disturbance. The agent mailed the obtained responses to authors after the 
data collection. 
 
Sample 
 
The working professionals of audit firms in Tehran are chosen as relevant 
participants for this study. The working accounting and audit professionals in 
Tehran are suitable participants because of their familiarity with audit processes 
and financial reporting in Iran. Following Best, Buckby, and Tan (2001), 
professionals are identified using Yellow Pages. The sample consists of 183 audit 
firms operating in Tehran. There was no coercion to participate in the study. The 
participants could answer as much or as little as they prefer. They showed their 
consent through submission of the questionnaire. This study obtains the responses 
of 40 participants, representing a response rate of 22%, which is suitable to draw 
an acceptable statistical conclusion (Baruch & Holtom, 2008). 
 
Reliability and Validity of the Questionnaire  
 
This study conducts a multivariate analysis of variance to determine the 
effects of participants‟ demographic characteristics on their perceptions regarding 
identified threats to auditor independence. Therefore, this study considers four 
different aspects of the participants‟ demographic information, as described in 
section I of the questionnaire.  
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Qualification level of participants is grouped into the diploma, bachelor, 
master, and PhD. They are coded from 1 to 4, respectively. Professional accounting 
qualification levels of participants are coded „0‟ (without any professional 
qualification) and „1‟ (with a professional qualification). The accounting 
experience level of participants are categorised between 1-3 years (coded as 1), 4-6 
years (coded as 2), 7-9 years (coded as 3), and over ten years (coded as 4). 
Similarly, the occupational experience level of participants is categorised between 
1-3 years (coded as 1), 4-6 years (coded as 2), 7-9 years (coded as 3), and over ten 
years (coded as 4). 
Guttmann‟s lambda-2 is a better method than Cronbach's alpha to measure the 
reliability of a questionnaire (Osburn, 2000; Sijtsma, 2009). Thus, following 
previous research (López et al., 2013; Menold, Kaczmirek, Lenzner, & Neusar, 
2014; Tan, Hemmelgarn, Baumgardner, & Tucker, 2017; Van der Ark, Van der 
Palm, & Sijtsma, 2011), this study computes Guttmann‟s lambda-2 to determine 
the reliability of its questionnaire. Guttmann‟s lambda-2 is 0.60, which is 
acceptable (Callender & Osburn, 1979). Moreover, following Aghaei and Ranjbar 
(2016) and Sudalaimuthu and Jesintha (2011), this study uses a Kaiser-Meyer-
Olkin measure of sampling adequacy to assess the validity of its questionnaire. 
The test yields the value of 0.571, which is above the acceptable value of 0.5 
(Kaiser, 1974). 
Because all samples are of equal size, the assumption of homogeneity of 
covariances across groups is not violated. This study, therefore, uses Wilks‟ 
lambda test (Leech, Barrett, & Morgan, 2012). Moreover, it checks the bivariate 
scatterplots for multivariate normality (Korkmaz, Goksuluk, & Zararsiz, 2014). 
This study considers the outcomes of the Levene‟s test for equality of variances to 
determine whether or not homogeneity of variances for different threats is violated 
(Gastwirth, Gel, & Miao, 2009). Table 3 shows the outcomes of Levene‟s test. 
 
Table 3. Levene’s test for Equality of Variances for Threats to Auditor 
Independence in Iran 
Threats to Auditor Independence F df1 df2 Sig 
Perceptions regarding gifts and presents 1.90 29 8 0.17 
Perceptions regarding bribery 3.75 29 8 0.03 
Perceptions regarding long-term relationship 0.88 29 8 0.63 
Perceptions regarding the prospects of 
reappointment 
2.10 29 8 0.14 
Perceptions regarding non-existence of an audit 
committee 
1.40 29 8 0.32 
Perceptions regarding auditors' lack of 
competence 
2.05 29 8 0.15 
 
Perceptions regarding bribery is significant at 5% (p = 0.03). Thus, the 
assumption of homogeneity of variances for bribery is violated (Ho, 2013). 
This study addresses this matter by transforming this variable to equalise the 
variances (Leech et al., 2012). It analyses the effects of participants‟ 
demographic characteristics on their perceptions regarding different threats. 
Table 4 presents the results 
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Table 4. Wilks’ lambda Test to Determine the Effects of Participants’ 
Demographic Characteristics on their Perceptions Regarding Threats to Auditor 
Independence 
Variable  Value F Sig Partial Eta Squared 
Intercept 0.00 135.18
a
 0.00 1.00 
EduQualification
b 
0.09 0.66 0.79 0.55 
ProQualification
c 
0.58 0.37
a
 0.86 0.42 
AccExperience
d 
0.03 0.89 0.61 0.60 
Occupation
e 
0.10 1.10
a
 0.48 0.69 
a. Exact statistic, b. Educational qualification level of participants, c. Professional accounting 
qualification level of participants, d. Accounting experience level of participants, and e. 
Occupational experience level of participants. 
 
Wilks‟ lambda test shows the results of the demographic variables and none is 
significant.  Educational qualification level of participants obtains Wilks‟ Λ = 
0.09, p = 0.79, and multivariate η2 = 0.55. Professional accounting qualification 
level of participants has Wilks‟ Λ = 0.58, p = 0.86, and multivariate η2 = 0.42. 
Accounting experience level of participants obtains Wilks‟ Λ = 0.03, p = 0.61, and 
multivariate η2 = 0.60. Lastly, occupational experience level of participants has 
Wilks‟ Λ = 0.10, p = 0.48, and multivariate η2 = 0.69. This finding implies that 
participants‟ demographic characteristics do not affect their perceptions regarding 
threats to independence. 
 
Data Analysis 
 
First, this study assesses the quantitative results of the closed-ended questions 
in five forms of Likert scale measures. It compares the figures against each other 
to determine relative priorities for the Iranian regulator. Following Best et al. 
(2001), this study compares the mean differences between different threats to 
determine the participants‟ relative perceptions. 
Second, this study uses open and axial coding to analyse the responses to the 
open-ended question. It conducts a detailed analysis of participants‟ responses to 
discover their views regarding their nominated threats. It categorises the 
nominated threats and assesses the relationships between different categories and 
their sub-categories (Wicks, 2010). Moreover, it investigates the missing 
relationships by searching for potential relationships among different classes 
(Wicks, 2010). The open-ended question provides the most commonly cited 
threats by participants. This study uses NVivo to analyse the written responses 
(Dogui, Boiral, & Heras‐Saizarbitoria, 2014; Dowling & Leech, 2014). It identifies 
six primary themes (higher level coding) and ten categories (lower level coding).  
This study analyses the collected data from financial media as follows. It 
compares triangulated thematic (financial corruption, financial scandal, audit 
failure, and accounting scandal) analysis of articles against the quantitative results 
in the first stage. It uses the following keywords to obtain the required 
information: “financial corruption, Iran”; “financial scandal, Iran”; “audit failure, 
Iran”; and “accounting scandal, Iran.” The search terms are subjective in the sense 
that the evidence of accounting and reporting failures is necessary to observe the 
Vol. X, No. Y Mirzay Fashami et al.: Threats to Auditor Independence: Evidence… 
 
22 
“worst case” scenario facing the Iranian financial and capital market. This study 
conducts a general search of Google and Persian news sites (such as Tabnak) to 
obtain the media articles. It selects reputable media sources with a given emphasis 
to British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), Tribune Content Agency LLC, and 
Financial Times Limited. It disregards the articles that come from sources where 
reliability may be a concern. 
 
 
Results 
 
Analysis of Participants’ Responses to Likert Scale Questions  
 
Participants have various qualification levels. Twelve and a half percent have 
a high-school diploma, 37.5% a bachelor‟s degree, 32.5% a master‟s degree, and 
17.5% have a doctoral degree. Seventy-two and a half percent do not have any 
professional accounting qualification. However, 5%, 7.5%, and 15% of 
participants are a member of Iranian Accounting Association, Iranian Institute of 
Certified Accountants, and the Iranian Association of Certified Public Accountants, 
respectively. Two participants did not mention their accounting experience level. 
One is without any experience, 22.5% with 1 to 3 years of experience, 7.5% with 4 
to 6 years, 35% with 7 to 9 years, and 27.5% with over ten years of experience. 
Twenty percent are accountants, 35% auditors, 5% consultants, and 40% are other 
professionals. Table 5 provides the participants‟ demographic information. 
 
Table 5. Demographic Information of Participants of this Study 
Statements Number of Participants 
Qualification level  
High-school diploma 5 
Bachelor 15 
Master 13 
PhD 7 
Professional accounting qualification  
No 29 
Iranian Accounting Association 2 
Iranian Association of Certified Public Accountants 6 
Iranian Institute of Certified Accountants 3 
Accounting experience  
No 1 
1 - 3 years 9 
4 - 6 years 3 
7 - 9 years 14 
Over ten years 11 
Current occupation  
Accountants 8 
Auditors 14 
Consultants 2 
Other professionals 16 
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Table 6 describes the participants‟ responses to Likert scale questions. 
 
Table 6. Participants’ Responses to Likert Scale Questions Regarding the Six 
Identified Threats to Auditor Independence in Iran 
 
Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree 
Neither agree 
nor disagree 
Agree 
Strongly 
agree 
Total 
Gifts and presents 
9 
(22.5%) 
14 
(35%) 
3 
(7.5%) 
7 
(17.5%) 
7 
(17.5%) 
40 
(100%) 
Bribery 
1 
(2.5%) 
2 
(5%) 
2 
(5%) 
19 
(47.5%) 
16 
(40%) 
40 
(100%) 
Long-term 
relationship 
0 
(0%) 
8 
(20%) 
9 
(22.5%) 
19 
(47.5%) 
4 
(10%) 
40 
(100%) 
Prospects of 
reappointment 
2 
(5%) 
5 
(12.5%) 
7 
(17.5%) 
20 
(50%) 
6 
(15%) 
40 
(100%) 
Non-existence of 
an audit committee 
1 
(2.5%) 
3 
(7.5%) 
15 
(37.5%) 
18 
(45%) 
3 
(7.5%) 
40 
(100%) 
Auditors‟ lack of 
competence 
3 
(7.5%) 
11 
(27.5%) 
7 
(17.5%) 
12 
(30%) 
7 
(17.5%) 
40 
(100%) 
 
Following previous research (Bell, Causholli, & Knechel, 2015; Best et al., 
2001; Earley & Kelly, 2004; Horvat & Lipičnik, 2016), this study compares mean 
differences between different threats to determine the participants‟ perceptions 
about them. All threats, except gifts and presents, and auditors‟ lack of 
competence, are statistically significant at 1%. Bribery obtains the highest mean 
(4.18), followed by prospects of reappointment (3.58). Long-term relationship and 
non-existence of an audit committee have an identical mean of 3.48, followed by 
auditors‟ lack of competence at 3.23. Gifts and presents obtain the lowest mean 
(2.73). Therefore, participants consider bribery as the strongest threat to auditor 
independence in Iran. The prospects of reappointment are the second most 
important threat. Long-term relationship and non-existence of an audit committee 
are equally the next important threats. The consideration of a long-term 
relationship between auditors and their clients and non-existence of an audit 
committee as threats to auditor independence is consistent with prior international 
studies as it was discussed in the literature review section. Gifts and presents, and 
auditors‟ lack of competence are not statistically significant threats to 
independence. Table 7 shows the participants‟ perceptions of different threats. 
 
Table 7. T-test of Participants’ Perceptions Regarding the Identified Threats 
to Auditor Independence in Iran 
Threats to Auditor Independence N Mean SD Mean Difference t p-value 
Gifts and presents 40 2.73 1.45 -0.27 -1.20 0.238 
Bribery 40 4.18 0.93 1.18 7.99 0.000 
Long-term relationship 40 3.48 0.93 0.48 3.22 0.003 
Prospects of reappointment 40 3.58 1.06 0.58 3.43 0.001 
Non-existence of an audit committee 40 3.48 0.85 0.48 3.55 0.001 
Auditors‟ lack of competence 40 3.23 1.25 0.23 1.14 0.262 
N = Number of observations 
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Bribery 
 
Transparency International‟s “Corruption Perceptions Index” scores Iran at 
27/100. The scores range from 0 to 100, where 100 is “very clean”. Transparency 
International ranks Iran at the 136
th
 place out of 175 nations (Transparency 
International, 2014). Iran has suffered from many reported scandals involving 
fraud. For instance, the Iranian banking system experienced embezzlement of 2.6 
billion USD in 2011, which is the biggest embezzlement case in its history 
(Shushter, 2011). High frequency and profile corruptions have attracted regulatory 
emphases from the Iranian Supreme Leader and other regulators. For example, the 
Iranian Supreme Leader, on various occasions, has instructed the heads of 
government, judiciary system, and parliament to combat financial corruption 
(BBC, 2008). This background as to fraud, bribery, and corruption in Iran justifies 
the participants‟ consideration of bribery as the strongest threat to auditor 
independence. 
 
Gifts and Presents  
 
As mentioned before, participants disregard gifts and presents as posing 
significant threats to auditor independence in Iran. An Iranian employee may bring 
some cakes to share with his colleagues, without aiming to get something in return 
(Kwintessential Ltd, 2014). Iranians offer money or gold coins on religious 
holidays and give gifts on various celebratory occasions such as weddings, 
successful business deals, or graduations (Iran Visitor, 2015). A host may offer his 
guest anything that looks attractive in his house as a gift (Betteridge, 1985). The 
participants‟ ignorance of gifts as independence threats may show the influence of 
the Iranian culture on their perceptions. It may show the effect of cultural 
differences between Iran and countries that do not traditionally perceive gifts in a 
similar way to Iranians within the audit profession.  
 
Auditors‟ Lack of Competence 
 
Prior Iranian research considers auditor‟s incompetency an independence 
threat (Mansouri et al., 2009; Salehi & Husini, 2011). However, this study 
dismisses prior studies‟ finding. Similar to gifts and presents, a lack of competence 
is not a significant threat to auditor independence in Iran. This finding aligns with 
the provision of IAO‟s 2014 framework where auditor incompetence is not on the 
list of threats to independence. However, IFAC requires auditors to be competent 
to perform their tasks. They should have adequate knowledge and experience of 
audit assignments that they undertake and a good knowledge and understanding of 
their clients‟ business and industry (IFAC, 2014b).  
  
Analysis of Participants’ Responses to the Open-ended Question 
 
Twenty-nine participants respond to the final question in the questionnaire by 
nominating other threats to auditor independence than those mentioned in the 
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questionnaire. Six professionals choose multiple threats. This study obtains 37 
instances of new information, suggesting some new threats to independence. Table 
8 shows the participants‟ responses to the open-ended question. 
 
Table 8. Participants’ Responses to the Open-Ended Question of this Study 
Participant  
No 
Quote 
1 Economic instability is a threat. 
2 In my opinion, weak economy of Iran is a threat. 
3 Management fraud 
4 The small income of auditors and excessive bureaucracy 
5 Bureaucracy and non-auditing services 
6 
Not-audit-related-services may be indicators of a threat to auditor 
independence. 
7 
In my opinion auditors‟ consulting services are signs of a threat to 
auditor independence in Iran. 
8 Auditors‟ competition and their advisory services 
9 The high auditor‟s fee and small size of audit firms 
10 
The pressure from management is a threat to auditor independence 
in Iran. 
11 Auditors‟ advisory and consulting services 
12 
The auditors‟ low income may be an indicator of threat to auditor 
independence in my opinion. 
13 The management‟s wrongdoing 
14 
Providing management advisory services by auditors may be a 
threat to auditor independence. 
15 I think competition among the auditors is another indicator. 
16 Poor infrastructure of the Iranian audit firms 
17 Significant amount of fees 
18 The auditors‟ low salary is another factor. 
19 
The small size of the Iranian audit firms is another indicator of 
threat to auditor independence. 
20 
The high amount of auditor‟s unemployment can be another threat 
to auditor independence in Iran in my opinion. 
21 Providing consulting and advisory services to managers 
22 The high unemployment rate of auditors 
23 Pressure from management 
24 
If the auditors sincerely report, they may lose their job. This fear is 
a threat to their independence. 
25 
The fact that auditors have to do lots of work and their salary is not 
enough, encouraging them for wrongdoing. 
26 
In my opinion, high competition between the audit firms and 
providing consulting services to management are indicators of a 
threat to auditor independence in Iran. 
27 
In my view, the dependency of audit firms to their major clients can 
be a danger for their objectivity in Iran. 
28 Bad financial condition of auditors 
29 
When the audit firms provide other services to their clients except 
for their routine services 
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Table 9 describes the identified themes and categories based on 
participants‟ responses to the open-ended question. 
 
Table 9. Identified Themes and Categories Based on Participants’ Responses to 
the Open-ended Question 
Themes Categories Definition Instances 
Competition 
among audit 
firms 
Competition among 
audit firms 
High competition level 
among Iranian audit firms 
3 
 
High audit fees 
 
High audit fees 
Clients‟ provision of high 
audit fees to auditors 
3 
Iran‟s economic 
condition 
High unemployment 
rate of auditors 
Large number of 
unemployed accountants in 
Iran 
2 
Low income of 
auditors, weak 
economy of Iran 
Small revenue of Iranian 
accountants, existing poor 
economic condition in Iran 
7 
 
Management‟s 
wrongdoings 
Management fraud 
Fraudulent activities 
perpetrated by management 
3 
Management pressure 
Pressure from management 
to guide auditors towards a 
particular direction 
3 
Non-audit 
services 
Management advisory 
services 
Auditors‟ provision of 
consulting services for their 
clients‟ management 
5 
Consultancy services 
Auditors‟ provision of 
different types of advisory 
services for their client firms 
6 
Poor 
infrastructure of 
audit firms 
Bureaucracy 
Complicated system of 
Iranian audit firms 
2 
Small size of audit 
firms 
Small size of Iranian audit 
firms 
3 
 
An evaluation of this component of the questionnaire shows that eleven 
participants nominate non-audit services, nine Iran‟s economic condition, six 
management‟s wrongdoings, five poor infrastructure of audit firms, three 
competition between audit firms, and three consider high audit fees as threats to 
auditor independence in Iran. The largest number of responses consider non-audit 
services and Iran‟s economic condition as „other‟ threats. This consideration of 
non-audit services as a threat is consistent with prior international academic 
literature (Campa & Donnelly, 2016; Causholli, Chambers, & Payne, 2014, 2015; 
Quick & Warming‐Rasmussen, 2015).  
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Non-audit Services  
 
A provision of non-audit services may result in self-interest, self-review, and 
advocacy threats (IFAC, 2014b). Prior international studies document that non-
audit services may impair auditor independence (Ashbaugh, LaFond, & Mayhew, 
2003; Francis & Ke, 2006; Kinney, Palmrose, & Scholz, 2004; Rankin, 2004). 
Non-audit services increase auditors‟ financial dependency on their auditees, 
reducing their desire to disagree with their clients‟ requirements (DeFond et al., 
2002). They discourage audit firms from issuing a qualified audit opinion (Hay, 
Knechel, & Li, 2006b). For example, auditors may issue a clean audit report for 
financial statements of a company which do not comply with auditing standards 
(Kinney et al., 2004). Moreover, the consultancy nature of non-audit services 
brings bias to auditors‟ judgement (SEC, 2000). 
 
Iran‟s Economic Condition 
 
Participants nominate Iran‟s economic condition as another threat to auditor 
independence. For example, a participant mentions that: 
 
"The high amount of auditor’s unemployment can be another threat to auditor 
independence in Iran in my opinion."  
 
Another respondent mentions that: 
 
“The auditors’ low income may be an indicator of threat to auditor independence in 
my opinion.” 
 
Iran is one of the youngest countries in the world. Thirty-five percent of 
Iranians are aged between 15 and 29. Moreover, Iran has a rapid population 
growth, wherein the size of the Iranian labour force grew by 2% every year during 
the 2014-2018 period (The Economist Intelligence Unit N.A., 2014). Iran‟s rapid 
population growth highlights its need for better employment. However, its 
unemployment rate is the 16
th
 highest in the world, and the country faces an 
unemployment rate of over 12%. This rate is higher for women and university 
graduates. University graduates struggle to find a job. Many educated Iranians 
work in fields that are unrelated to their specialisation. They may even need to 
have two or more jobs to survive (Bozorgmehr, 2012). According to the Iranian 
Deputy Labour Minister, Abu-Hassan Firouz-Abadi, around 200,000 Iranians 
were receiving unemployment benefits in 2014. Abu-Hassan Firouz-Abadi 
considers high unemployment rate a major challenge for the Iranian government 
(Anonymous, 2014a). Similarly, the head of Iran‟s Workers House warns 
regarding potential workers‟ crisis (Bozorgmehr, 2012). 
International sanctions have decreased economic growth rate of Iran, 
increasing its unemployment rate. Unemployment remains a major concern for 
young Iranians, while their country is under sanction (The Economist Intelligence 
Unit N.A., 2014). According to a former representative of the International Labour 
Organisation, wrong economic policies have increased unemployment rate in Iran. 
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The former Iranian president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejat, has focused on offering 
loans to jobseekers rather than funding infrastructure projects. A reduction in 
energy subsidies for households and industry has damaged the Iranian economy 
(Bozorgmehr, 2012). The ease of international sanctions as a result of Iran‟s 
agreement with world powers over its nuclear programme along with a policy of 
reduction of energy subsidies of the new president, Hassan Rouhani, has reduced 
inflation rate in the country. The new government is scaling back the cash 
subsidies that were handed out by the former government, leading to a reduction 
of the inflation rate from 45% to 15% in 2014 (Anonymous, 2014b). The harsh 
economic condition may encourage auditors to give in to their clients‟ desire to 
maintain their income. This leniency can become greater for dependence on higher 
fees because auditors are more likely to impair their independence to retain their 
valuable clients (Lim & Tan, 2010). 
 
Media Articles and Findings 
 
This study analyses 49 media articles of different sources for the period 1994 
- 2014. It limits its analysis to 2014 as IAO issued the auditor independence 
framework in 2014. The articles are analysed in chronological order, wherein “1” 
is assigned to the most recent article and “49” to the oldest article. This study 
categorises the articles based on their contents into two broad categories of 
regulatory and economic perspectives. Regulatory perspectives encompass Iran‟s 
aspiration to join the international community, and economic perspectives capture 
articles that refer to economic losses of wrongdoings. Majority of sources have 
economic perspectives. An evaluation of keywords and publication sources shows 
that various media sources (such as BBC) frequently discuss financial corruption 
in the Iranian economy. Moreover, they often criticise IAO. Table 10 describes the 
entire sample of examined media articles. 
 
Table 10. Description of the Examined Media Articles Including their Titles, 
Publication Dates, and Keywords and Sources Used to Obtain Them 
Article-
No 
Keyword Title Source Date 
Panel A Regulatory Perspectives 
1 
Financial 
corruption, 
Iran 
Rouhani confronts 
Iran‟s hardliners on 
corruption 
The Financial 
Times Limited 
8/12/2014 
7 Fraud, Iran 
The Iranian 
government‟s plan to 
prevent occurrence of 
fraud in future 
Tabnak 1/05/2014 
8 
Financial 
corruption, 
Iran 
Iran president orders 
fight against financial 
corruption 
BBC 
 
2/02/2014 
 
9 
Financial 
corruption, 
Iran 
BBC Monitoring quotes 
from Iranian press 01 
Feb 2014 
BBC 
 
1/02/2014 
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10 
Financial 
corruption, 
Iran 
Iran intelligence 
minister opposes 
publicising financial 
corruption 
BBC 
 
14/01/2014 
 
11 
Financial 
corruption, 
Iran 
Iran arrests business 
tycoon over corruption 
scandal 
Indo Asian News 
Service 
5/01/2014 
14 
Audit 
failure, Iran 
Iran MP urges 
government to pay 
attention to tax revenues 
BBC 31/12/2013 
16 Fraud, Iran 
Keeping our eyes on 
Iran 
The Jerusalem 
Post Ltd 
25/06/2013 
17 Fraud, Iran 
Iran Islamic Republic 
of, United States: 
Treasury targets 
network attempting to 
evade Iran sanctions 
Albawaba 
(London) Ltd 
12/04/2013 
19 
Financial 
corruption, 
Iran 
 
Iran Speaker says 
“intelligence chiefs” 
involved in financial 
corruption 
 
 
 
BBC 
7/01/2013 
24 
Financial 
corruption, 
Iran 
 
Commentary terms 
embezzlement in Iran 
unforgivable act 
 
 
BBC 
 
3/07/2012 
25 
Financial 
corruption, 
Iran 
 
 
„State‟ bodies stymie 
Iran privatisations 
 
 
The Financial 
Times Limited 
30/05/2012 
33 
Financial 
corruption, 
Iran 
Iran MPs urge Judiciary 
to follow up financial 
corruption network‟s 
case 
 
 
BBC 
 
10/03/2010 
35 
Financial 
corruption, 
Iran 
 
Iran‟s creeping 
corruption 
IBT Media, Inc., 
The 
Newsweek/Daily 
Beast Company 
LLC 
30/11/2009 
40 
Financial 
corruption, 
Iran 
Iran leader calls for 
continuation of 
campaign against 
financial corruption 
BBC 25/06/2008 
42 
Financial 
corruption, 
Iran 
Iran‟s new attempt to 
privatise state-owned 
enterprises 
BBC 31/07/2006 
43 
Financial 
corruption, 
Iran 
Iran‟s presence at World 
Trade Organisation 
inevitable – former 
president 
BBC 
 
25/01/2006 
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46 
Financial 
corruption, 
Iran 
Single forex rate to curb 
financial corruption in 
Iran: Official 
Middle East News 
Online 
 
4/03/2002 
 
Panel B Economic Perspectives 
2 
Audit 
failure, Iran 
US watchdog fines 
Standard Chartered for 
second time: Money-
laundering failure costs 
bank further $300m: 
High-risk dealings went 
undetected, says 
regulator 
Guardian News & 
Media Limited 
20/08/2014 
3 
Audit 
failure, Iran 
Iran official dismisses 
Audit Court report on 
oil sale to UAE 
 
 
 
BBC 
 
23/07/2014 
4 Fraud, Iran 
Supreme Audit Court of 
Iran confirms 
government‟s taking 
$4.1 billion out of NDF 
 
Tribune Content 
Agency LLC 
 
28/05/2014 
5 
Accounting 
scandal, Iran 
Brief: Iran dismisses 
scandal of selling 
recorded phone talks 
 
Tribune Content 
Agency LLC 
 
20/05/2014 
6 
Financial 
corruption, 
Iran 
Fugitive accused of 
financial corruption 
handed over to Iran 
Tribune Content 
Agency LLC 
7/05/2014 
12 
Financial 
corruption, 
Iran 
Iran daily discusses 
financial corruption in 
Turkey 
BBC 3/01/2014 
13 
Audit 
failure, Iran 
Iran government 
neglects tax revenue due 
to high oil income 
BBC 1/01/2014 
15 
Audit 
failure, Iran 
Iran Audit Court accuses 
president of 
misspending surplus 
revenues 
BBC 25/06/2013 
18 
Financial 
corruption, 
Iran 
Iran: Corruption case 
raises Iran domestic 
tensions 
Al Jazeera 4/02/2013 
20 
Accounting 
scandal, Iran 
Standard Chartered bank 
accused of scheming 
with Iran to hide 
transactions 
Guardian News & 
Media Limited 
7/08/2012 
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21 
Accounting 
scandal, Iran 
Standard Chartered 
diving despite Iran 
scandal denial 
Evening Standard 
Limited, Solo 
Syndication, a 
division of 
Associated 
Newspapers Ltd 
 
7/08/2012 
22 
Accounting 
scandal, Iran 
Death terms in Iran bank 
scandal 
Al Jazeera 
 
30/07/2012 
 
23 
Accounting 
scandal, Iran 
Iran bank fraud scandal: 
4 sentenced to death 
Yeganeh 
 
30/07/2012 
26 
Financial 
corruption, 
Iran 
Brief: MP: Corruption 
costs Iran $34 billion a 
year 
Tribune Content 
Agency LLC 
 
 
18/12/2011 
 
27 
Audit 
failure, Iran 
Iran Audit Court sends 
report on government 
“violations” to judiciary 
BBC 
 
17/12/2011 
 
28 
Accounting 
scandal, Iran 
Iran arrests relative of 
president‟s aid over 
embezzlement scandal 
Xinhua News 
Agency 
8/11/2011 
29 Fraud, Iran 
Two other suspects 
arrested over Iran‟s 
embezzlement case 
Tribune Content 
Agency LLC 
28/10/2011 
30 
Accounting 
scandal, Iran 
 
Iran‟s largest banks 
swindled out of $2.6 
Billion 
NPR 27/10/2011 
31 
Accounting 
scandal, Iran 
 
Quds Force linked to 
bank in Iran scandal 
 
The Globe & Mail 
division of Bell 
Globe media 
Publishing Inc. 
12/10/2011 
32 
Accounting 
scandal, Iran 
Israeli billionaire at 
heart of Iran trade 
scandal dies 
The Financial 
Times Limited 
3/06/2011 
34 
Financial 
corruption, 
Iran 
Iran arrests 15 members 
of “financial corruption 
network” 
BBC 30/01/2010 
36 
 
Fraud, Iran 
 
Iran: “Iran‟s missing oil 
money” 
Thai News 
Service Group 
8/05/2009 
37 Fraud, Iran 
Iran: In search of $1b 
missing oil money in 
Iran 
Thai News 
Service Group 
16/02/2009 
38 Fraud, Iran 
Iran minister sacked 
over forgery 
BBC 4/11/2008 
39 
Financial 
corruption, 
Iran 
Iran charges seven with 
financial corruption 
BBC 14/07/2008 
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41 
Audit 
failure, Iran 
President orders 
dismissal of Iran 
Insurance‟s board of 
directors 
BBC 9/05/2007 
44 
Financial 
corruption, 
Iran 
Halliburton‟s activities 
suspended in Iran 
BBC 22/08/2005 
45 
Accounting 
scandal, Iran 
Iran: Oil Ministry to 
complain against 
Norway over Statoil 
scandal 
BBC 9/11/2003 
47 
Financial 
corruption, 
Iran 
World: Middle East 
Tehran mayor sentence 
reduced 
BBC 24/12/1998 
48 
Accounting 
scandal, Iran 
Tehran mayor is 
arrested, accused of 
embezzlement 
Deseret News 5/04/1998 
49 
Financial 
corruption, 
Iran 
Iran needs foreign 
investment 
Chemical Week 20/07/1994 
 
Triangulation of financial media analysis against the questionnaire results 
suggests that bribery frequently occurs in Iran. Thirteen of 49 articles (26.5%) 
show that bribery exists in the country, justifying its consideration as the most 
serious independence threat by participants. For example, article 41 with the title 
of “president orders dismissal of Iran Insurance‟s board of directors” shows that 
the president orders this dismissal because of a State Audit Office's report 
regarding extensive scandal cases in the insurance company. 
An analysis of the economic impacts of wrongdoings shows that they 
severely damage the country, causing Iran to lose billions of dollars. For example, 
article 4 with the title of “Supreme Audit Court of Iran confirms government‟s 
taking $4.1 billion out of NDF” describes how the government illegally took large 
money out of the National Development Fund. The analysis supports participants‟ 
nomination of Iran‟s economic condition as a threat to auditor independence. An 
examination of gifts shows that they are not discussed in media articles, supporting 
participants‟ view to disregard them as threats. 
 
Robustness Checks 
 
This study performs two robustness checks to verify its findings. 
 
Friedman Test 
 
This study conducts a Friedman test to prioritise different threats to auditor 
independence, following (Salehi, 2011). The test shows a statistically significant 
difference in perceptions regarding different threats to auditor independence, X
2
(2) 
= 31.883, p = 0.000. Table 11 presents the results. 
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Table 11. Friedman test to Prioritise Different Threats to Auditor Independence in 
Iran 
 N 25
th
 Median 75
th
 Mean 
The Perceptions regarding gifts 40 2.000 2.000 4.000 2.610 
The Perceptions regarding bribery 40 4.000 4.000 5.000 4.700 
The Perceptions regarding long-term 
relationship 
40 3.000 4.000 4.000 3.460 
The Perceptions regarding the prospects of 
reappointment 
40 3.000 4.000 4.000 3.700 
The Perceptions regarding non-existence of 
audit committee 
40 3.000 4.000 4.000 3.380 
The Perceptions regarding auditors' lack of 
competence 
40 2.000 3.000 4.000 3.150 
N = Number of observations. 
 
The perceptions regarding bribery obtain the highest mean (4.700), suggesting 
that participants consider bribery as the most severe threat. 
 
Exclusion of Gifts and Presents and Auditors' Lack of Competence 
 
This study does not find „gifts and presents‟ and auditors‟ lack of competence 
as significant threats to auditor independence in Iran. Hence, it excludes them to 
re-estimate the findings regarding different threats. Table 12 shows the outcomes. 
 
Table 12. T-test of Participants’ Perceptions Regarding Identified Threats to 
Auditor Independence without Gifts and Auditors’ Lack of Competence 
Threats to Auditor 
Independence 
N Mean SD Mean Difference t p-value 
Bribery 40 4.18 0.93 1.18 28.37 0.000 
Long-term relationship 40 3.48 0.93 0.48 23.55 0.000 
Prospects of 
reappointment 
40 3.58 1.06 0.58 21.34 0.000 
Non-existence of an 
audit committee 
 
40 
 
3.48 
 
0.85 
 
0.48 
 
25.95 
 
0.000 
N = Number of observations. 
 
The test confirms previous findings. All remaining threats are statistically 
significant. Moreover, bribery is the most potent threat to independence. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
This study evaluates threats to auditor independence in Iran through the 
distribution of a mixed questionnaire to Iranian professionals and thematic 
9analysis of media articles. Findings show that participants consider bribery, 
followed by prospects of reappointment as the most severe threats. Long-term 
relationship and non-existence of an audit committee are equally the next 
important threats. However, gifts and presents, and auditors‟ lack of competence 
Vol. X, No. Y Mirzay Fashami et al.: Threats to Auditor Independence: Evidence… 
 
34 
are not threats. Moreover, participants perceive non-audit services and Iran‟s 
economic condition as other threats to independence. The consideration of bribery 
as the strongest threat shows its entrenched position within Iranian businesses and 
a need to introduce advanced strategies to safeguard businesses against it. The 
Iranian government should introduce advanced strategies to safeguard the country 
against bribery. This will eventually enhance auditor independence. High losses 
caused by corrupt practices encourage authorities to concentrate on issues of 
corruption and create some practical plans to minimise it. They need to introduce 
better regulations to address the corruption concerns in Iran.  
The nomination of Iran‟s economic condition by participants as a threat 
shows the influence of the economic factors on business people‟s behaviour. The 
undesirable economic condition of the country is acknowledged, through analysis 
of the media articles. This analysis suggests the implementation of practical ways 
to improve the economic condition of the country. A better economic condition 
reduces the need for all participants in business activity to use illegal or immoral 
methods to conduct their business, increasing the overall health of the capital 
market. The government may need to think of some solutions to reduce the 
unemployment rate of auditors and increase their income level. The audit 
regulations may need to provide some financial safeguards for auditors. The 
provision of more job opportunities to auditors reduces their desire to succumb to 
management pressure, increasing their independence. Similarly, higher levels of 
income increase auditors‟ persistence against the management‟s fraudulent 
requests. 
The nomination of non-audit services as threats suggests to the Iranian 
regulator to place more emphasis on them and introduce new rules to restrict them. 
Because non-audit services are widely acknowledged as threats to auditor 
independence in international literature, Iran‟s new aspiration to join the 
international community may encourage its regulator to introduce similar rules as 
those in IFRS countries to regulate non-audit services. The consideration of non-
audit services as potential threats may improve auditor independence in Iran. 
Similarly, the participants of this study‟s consideration of prospects of 
reappointment, long-term relationship, non-existence of audit committee, and 
auditors‟ lack of competence as threats recommend to the Iranian regulator to align 
audit regulations to those of IFRS countries. The regulator should consider this 
study‟s identified threats as potential threats to auditor independence. However, 
disregard of gifts and presents as threats reminds us of the importance of cultural 
factors in a business environment. The regulator should also align audit regulations 
with cultural perceptions of people. It may need, while aligning the rules, to help 
Iran to join the international community, consider specific cultural factors too.  
IAO has not ranked in order of priority the 11 identified threats to auditor 
independence in Iran (see Section 1). This study recommends some improvements 
to the current IAO‟s independence framework, as follows: 
Bribery should remain as the strongest threat in the framework. 
A long-term relationship between auditors and their clients (which covers 
audit partner tenure and prospects of reappointment) should remain as the second 
strongest threat in the framework.  
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The non-existence of an audit committee should be included as the third 
strongest threat in the framework. 
Non-audit services should remain as priority threats.  
High management pressure on auditors (which relates to prospects of 
reappointment), and high audit fees (which is an identified category of the open-
ended question) should remain in the framework as priority threats. 
Acceptance of gifts and presents; family, personal, or financial relationship 
between auditors and their clients; inclusion of auditors in their clients‟ board of 
directors, senior officers, or partners; existence of contingent fees; ownership of 
audit firms by those other than auditors; presence of former audit partners as 
clients; and existence of lawsuits between auditors and their clients should remain 
as non-priority threats in the framework. 
This study contributes to a better understanding of auditor independence in 
Iran, which may apply to other regional settings. Moreover, it provides some 
suggestions to improve the current IAO‟s independence framework. However, it 
suffers from some limitations. First, many Iranian audit firms are not computerised 
(Salehi, Rostami, & Mogadam, 2010). So, a paper-based questionnaire was used. 
The capacity to collect data was reduced, and it was time-consuming. Second, 40 
responses were obtained in total, reducing the credibility of the outcomes of this 
study. For example, Salehi et al. (2009a) obtain 441 responses, Ramazani and 
Atani (2010) 178 responses, and Salehi (2011) 150 responses in other comparable 
Iranian studies. Third, the obtained data are limited to the city of Tehran and do 
not provide any information regarding the practitioners‟ perceptions in other 
Iranian cities. Fourth, this study used an agent in Iran, which prevents it from 
verifying that the testing has occurred in a controlled environment. For example, it 
is unclear whether or not audit firms that agreed to participate had any input into 
their participants, which may have biased their responses.  
This study provides several avenues for future research. First, a more 
comprehensive analysis of media articles may provide better capacity for 
triangulation of outcomes of the questionnaire. Second, future studies may 
evaluate other threats that IAO has identified and obtain participants‟ views in 
other Iranian cities than Tehran. Third, future broad-scale studies of the effects of 
the Iranian culture on other aspects of the audit profession is another avenue. 
Fourth, an assessment of the best possible regulations to address non-audit services 
and an analysis of their implementation barriers are desirable. Fifth, future studies 
may analyse the effects of Iran‟s economic condition on other aspects of the audit 
profession. 
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Appendix 1. The Questionnaire of this Study 
Section I. Demographic Information 
What is your highest qualification level? 
 
                            Business-related                                                                         Non-business-related 
High-school diploma       
Bachelor  
Master  
PhD  
  
 
Do you have any professional accounting qualification? 
Yes             No  
If yes: 
Iranian Accounting Association  
Iranian Association of Certified Public Accountants  
Iranian Institute of Certified Accountants   
If you have any other qualification indicate it, please: 
…………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………… 
Do you have any accounting experience?   
Yes             No  
If yes: 
1 - 3 years  
4 - 6 years 
7 - 9 years 
Over 10 years (Indicate the number of years, please):            
...............................................................................................................................
..................... 
 
Describe the type of accounting experience that you have, please: 
…………………………………………………………………………………
……………….…………………………………………………………………
……………………………... 
 
What is your current occupation? 
Regulator 
Accountant  
Auditor 
Consultant 
Investor 
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Other (Indicate your current occupation, please):        
…………………………………………………………………………………
……………… 
 
How long have you been in your current occupation? 
1 - 3 years 
4 - 6 years 
7 - 9 years  
Over 10 years (Indicate the number of years, please): 
…………………………………………………………………………………
……………… 
 
Section II: Experience and Perception on Threats to Auditor Independence 
Each of the following presents a scenario of ethical issues. First, please 
mention any experience that you may have had regarding the specified ethical 
issues in your professional life. Then, please rank each scenario on a scale of 
one (1) as low to five (5) as high across the questions. 
The Iranian Code of Professional Conduct considers the gifts and presentations as serious 
threats to auditor independence (Term: 21.13). The Code indicates that the auditors should 
refrain from accepting or giving any gifts or presentations that may affect their professional 
judgement (Term: 15.2.E). 
Have you ever had any experience regarding gifts and presentations in your professional life? 
Yes             No  
How much of monetary value of a gift is more than a reasonable amount in your opinion? 
$0 
$50 or less  
$100 or less 
$200 or less  
Higher (Indicate the value, please):              
…………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
Gifts and presentations are 
indicators of threat to auditor 
independence in Iran. 
    
1         2         3         4         5 
Gifts and presentations are not 
indicators of threat to auditor 
independence in Iran. 
 
Article 49 of the Iranian Constitution requires the Iranian government to confiscate the wealth 
obtained from bribery and return it to its legitimate owner. Further, the Iranian Institute of Certified 
Accountants Code of Professional Conduct considers the moral characteristics of accountants as the 
most important part of their profession. 
Have you ever had any experience regarding bribery in your professional life? 
Yes             No  
Bribery is an indicator of threat 
to auditor independence in Iran. 
    
1         2         3         4         5 
Bribery is not an indicator of 
threat to auditor independence 
in Iran. 
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According to the Iranian Code of Professional Conduct a long-term relationship between the 
auditors and their clients may threat auditor independence. In such circumstances, the auditors 
should take the necessary measures to safeguard their independence. 
What is the longest duration of a relationship between the auditors and their clients that you have 
ever seen in your professional life? 
5 years or less  
7 years or less 
10 years or less  
Other (Indicate the number of years, please): 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………......... 
Long-term relationship is an 
indicator of threat to auditor 
independence in Iran. 
 
    
1         2         3         4         5 
Long-term relationship is not 
an indicator of threat to auditor 
independence in Iran. 
 
The academic literature suggests that the prospect of reappointment can endanger auditor 
independence, since the auditors may sacrifice their commitments in order to continue receiving 
their audit fees. 
The prospect of reappointment 
is an indicator of threat to 
auditor independence in Iran. 
 
    
1         2         3         4         5 
The prospect of reappointment 
is not an indicator of threat to 
auditor independence in Iran. 
 
According to the Tehran Stock Exchange regulations, audit committees assist the Board of Directors 
regarding internal control and risk management, financial reporting, internal audit effectiveness, 
independent audit effectiveness, and compliance with the rules, provisions, and requirements. 
Have you ever had any experience regarding working with an audit committee in your professional 
life?  
Yes             No               
The non-existence of audit 
committee is an indicator of 
threat to auditor independence 
in Iran. 
 
   
1         2         3         4         5 
The non-existence of audit 
committee is not an indicator of 
threat to auditor independence 
in Iran. 
 
According to the Iranian Code of Professional Conduct the auditors should have the required skills 
to perform their duties. They should consistently maintain their professional knowledge and skill of 
regulations and changes in the profession.  
The auditor lack of skill is an 
indicator of threat to auditor 
independence in Iran. 
  
1         2         3         4         5 
The auditor lack of skill is not 
an indicator of threat to auditor 
independence in Iran. 
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Section III: Additional Comments on Threats to Auditor Independence in Iran 
Are there any other factors that are indicators of threat to auditor independence in Iran in your 
opinion? 
Yes             No  
If yes indicate them, please: 
………………………………………………………………………………………………………..... 
………………………………………………………………………………………………………..... 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
 
 
 
